Case Digests for Assigned Articles of the Family Code

Articles 377 and 378.

Yasin V. Sharia District Court

G.R. No. 94986, 23 February 1995

FACTS:

On 5 May 1990, Hatima C. Yasin filed in the Shari'a District Court in Zamboanga City a "Petition to resume the use of maiden name.” The respondent court ordered amendments to the petition as it was not sufficient in form and substance in accordance Rule 103, Rules of Court, regarding the residence of petitioner and the name sought to be adopted is not properly indicated in the title thereof which should include all the names by which the petitioner has been known. Hatima filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order alleging that the petition filed is not covered by Rule 103 of the Rules of Court but is merely a petition to resume the use of her maiden name and surname after the dissolution of her marriage by divorce under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, and after marriage of her former husband to another woman. The respondent court denied the motion since compliance to rule 103 is necessary if the petition is to be granted, as it would result in the resumption of the use of petitioner’s maiden name and surname.

ISSUE:

Whether or not in the case of annulment of marriage, or divorce under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, and the husband is married again to another woman and the former desires to resume her maiden name or surname, is she required to file a petition for change of name and comply with the formal requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.

RULING:

NO. When a woman marries a man, she need not apply and/or seek judicial authority to use her husband's name by prefixing the word "Mrs." before her husband's full name or by adding her husband's surname to her maiden first name. The law grants her such right (Art. 370, Civil Code). Similarly, when the marriage ties or vinculum no longer exists as in the case of death of the husband or divorce as authorized by the Muslim Code, the widow or divorcee need not seek judicial confirmation of the change in her civil status in order to revert to her maiden name as the use of her former husband's name is optional and not obligatory for her. When petitioner married her husband, she did not change her name but only her civil status. Neither was she required to secure judicial authority to use the surname of her husband after the marriage, as no law requires it. The use of the husband's surname during the marriage, after annulment of the marriage and after the death of the husband is permissive and not obligatory except in case of legal separation.

The court finds the petition to resume the use of maiden name filed by petitioner before the respondent court a superfluity and unnecessary proceeding since the law requires her to do so as her former husband is already married to another woman after obtaining a decree of divorce from her in accordance with Muslim laws.

Articles 209-213.

Miguel R. Unson III, petitioner, v. Hon. Pedro C. Navarro And Edita N. Araneta, respondents.

G.R. No. L-52242, 17 November 1980

Facts:

On 19 April 1971, Miguel and Edita were married. By 1 December 1971, Edita bore their daughter named Maria Teresa Unson. Since June 1972, the petitioner and private respondent were living separately. On 13 July 1974, the respondent judge presided the judicial agreement of the couple for the separation of properties and live separately. The agreement do not contain any provision regarding the custody of the child since they have their own separate arrangement.

In the early part of 1978, the petitioner found out the following information regarding his wife: (1) she was in a relation with her brother-in-law and godfather of their child (a former seminarian at that), Maria Teresa; (2) that the brother-in-law was being treated for manic depressive disorder; (3) the illicit affair produced 2 children; and (4) that Edita and her brother-in-law embraced a Protestant faith.

On 28 December 1979, the respondent judge ordered the petitioner to produce the child, Maria Teresa Unson, his daughter barely eight years of age, with private respondent Edita N. Araneta and return her to the custody of the later, further obliging petitioner to "continue his support of said daughter by providing for her education and medical needs," allegedly issued without a "hearing" and the reception of testimony in violation of Section 6 of Rule 99.

Issue:

Can the child stay with her mother given the immoral relationship the mother entered into?

Held:

No. The Court ruled it is in the best interest that the child Maria Teresa no longer stay with her mother given the immoral situation the mother entered into. The Court granted that the child stay with the petitioner.

Article 173.

Marquino vs Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC, now Court of Appeals)

Eutiquio Marquino and Maria Terenal-Marquino (wife) survived by Luz Marquino, Ana Marquino and Eva Marquino “legitimate children” (Petitioners) v. Bibiana Romano-Pagadora survived by Pedro, Emy, June, Edgar, May, Mago, Arden and Mars Pagadora (Respondents)

GR No. 72078, 27 June 1994

Facts:

Respondent Bibiana filed action for Judicial Declaration of Filiation, Annulment of Partition, Support and Damages against Eutiquio. Bibiana was born on December 1926 allegedly of Eutiquio and in that time was single. It was alleged that the Marquino family personally knew her since she was hired as domestic helper in their household at Dumaguete. She likewise received financial assistance from them hence, she enjoyed continuous possession of the status of an acknowledged natural child by direct and unequivocal acts of the father and his family. The Marquinos denied all these. Respondent was not able to finish presenting her evidence since she died on March 1979 but the sue for compulsory recognition was done while Eutiquio was still alive. Her heirs were ordered to substitute her as parties-plaintiffs.

Petitioners, legitimate children of Eutiquio, assailed decision of respondent court in holding that the heirs of Bibiana, allegedly a natural child of Eutiquio, can continue the action already filed by her to compel recognition and the death of the putative parent will not extinguish such action and can be continued by the heirs substituting the said deceased parent.

Issues:

1. Can the right of action for acknowledgment as a natural child be transmitted to the heirs?; and

2. Can Article 173 can be given retroactive effect?

Held:

SC ruled that right of action for the acknowledgment as a natural child can never be transmitted because the law does not make any mention of it in any case, not even as an exception. The right is purely a personal one to the natural child. The death of putative father in an action for recognition of a natural child can not be continued by the heirs of the former since the party in the best position to oppose the same is the putative parent himself.

Such provision of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect so as to apply in the case at bar since it will prejudice the vested rights of petitioners transmitted to them at the time of death of their father.

IAC decision was reversed and set aside. Complaint against Marquinos dismissed.

Article 143-146.

SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO, petitioner, v. SUSAN YEE CARIÑO, respondent.

G.R. No. 132529, 2 February 2001

Facts:

In 1969 SPO4 Santiago Cariño married Susan Nicdao Cariño. He had 2 children with her. In 1992, SPO4 contracted a second marriage, this time with Susan Yee Cariño. In 1988, prior to his second marriage, SPO4 is already bedridden and he was under the care of Yee. In 1992, he died 13 days after his marriage with Yee. Thereafter, the spouses went on to claim the benefits of SPO4. Nicdao was able to claim a total of P140,000.00 while Yee was able to collect a total of P21,000.00. In 1993, Yee filed an action for collection of sum of money against Nicdao. She wanted to have half of the P140k. Yee admitted that her marriage with SPO4 was solemnized during the subsistence of the marriage b/n SPO4 and Nicdao but the said marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due to the absence of a valid marriage license as certified by the local civil registrar. Yee also claimed that she only found out about the previous marriage on SPO4’s funeral.

Issue:

Whether or not the absolute nullity of marriage may be invoked to claim presumptive legitimes.

Held:

The marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due the absence of a valid marriage license. The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void for the same has been solemnized without the judicial declaration of the nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4. Under Article 40 of the FC, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void.

The SC ruled that Yee has no right to the benefits earned by SPO4 as a policeman for their marriage is void due to bigamy; she is only entitled to properties, money etc owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. Wages and salaries earned by each party shall belong to him or her exclusively (Art. 148 of FC). Nicdao is entitled to the full benefits earned by SPO4 as a cop even if their marriage is likewise void. This is because the two were capacitated to marry each other for there were no impediments but their marriage was void due to the lack of a marriage license; in their situation, their property relations is governed by Art 147 of the FC which provides that everything they earned during their cohabitation is presumed to have been equally contributed by each party – this includes salaries and wages earned by each party notwithstanding the fact that the other may not have contributed at all.

Article 107.

SPOUSES ELISEO F. ESTARES and ROSENDA P. ESTARES, petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. DAMASO HERRERA as Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 24, Biñan, Laguna PROMINENT LENDING & CREDIT CORPORATION, PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF LAGUNA and Sheriff IV ARNEL G. MAGAT, respondents.

G.R. No. 144755, 8 June 2005

Facts:

The spouses Estares secured a loan of P800k from Prominent Lending & Credit Corporation (PLCC) in 1998. To secure the loan, they mortgaged a parcel of land. They however only received P637k as testified by Rosenda Estares in court. She did not however question the discrepancy. At that time, her husband was in Algeria working. The loan eventually went due and the spouses were unable to pay. So PLCC petitioned for an extrajudicial foreclosure. The property was eventually foreclosed.

Now, the spouses are questioning the validity of the loan as they alleged that they agreed to an 18% per annum interest rate but PLCC is now charging them 3.5% interest rate per month; they also questioned the terms of the loan.

PLCC argued that the spouses were properly apprised of the terms of the loan. On the procedural aspect, PLCC claims that the petition filed by the spouses is invalid because the certification of non-forum shopping was only signed by Rosenda and her husband did not sign.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition filed by the spouses is valid.

HELD:

Yes, but their petition shall not prosper due to substantial grounds. The spouses were properly apprised by the terms of the loan; they did not question the terms of the loan when they had the opportunity when it did not yet mature. Rosenda even acknowledged the terms of the loan in court.

On the procedural aspect, even though Eliseo did not sign the certification (because he was in Algeria), there is still substantial compliance with the rules. After all they share a common interest in the property involved since it is conjugal property, and the petition questioning the propriety of the decision of the Court of Appeals originated from an action brought by the spouses, and is clearly intended for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Considering that the husband was at that time an overseas contract worker working in Algeria, whereas the petition was prepared in Sta. Rosa, Laguna, a rigid application of the rules on forumshopping that would disauthorize the wife’s signing the certification in her behalf and that of her husband is too harsh and clearly uncalled for.

Article 91.

FRANCISCO MUÑOZ, JR., Petitioner, v. ERLINDA RAMIREZ and ELISEO CARLOS, Respondents

G.R. No. 156125, 25 August 2010

FACTS:

The residential lot in the subject property was registered in the name of Erlinda Ramirez, married to Eliseo Carlos (respondents). On 6 April 1989, Eliseo, a Bureau of Internal Revenue employee, mortgaged said lot, with Erlinda’s consent, to the GSIS to secure a P136,500.00 housing loan, payable within twenty (20) years, through monthly salary deductions of P1,687.66. The respondents then constructed a thirty-six (36)-square meter, two-story residential house on the lot. On 14 July 1993, the title to the subject property was transferred to the petitioner by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale, dated 30 April 1992, executed by Erlinda, for herself and as attorney-in-fact of Eliseo, for a stated consideration of P602,000.00.

On 24 September 1993, the respondents filed a complaint with the RTC for the nullification of the deed of absolute sale, claiming that there was no sale but only a mortgage transaction, and the documents transferring the title to the petitioner’s name were falsified. The respondents presented the results of the scientific examination conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation of Eliseo’s purported signatures in the Special Power of Attorney dated 29 April 1992 and the Affidavit of waiver of rights dated 29 April 1992, showing that they were forgeries. The petitioner, on the other hand, introduced evidence on the paraphernal nature of the subject property since it was registered in Erlinda’s name.

The RTC ruled for petitioner finding that the property is paraphernal and consequently, the NBI finding that Eliseo’s signatures in the special power of attorney and in the affidavit were forgeries was immaterial because Eliseo’s consent to the sale was not necessary. The CA reversed and held that pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 158 of the Civil Code and Calimlim-Canullas v. Hon. Fortun, the subject property, originally Erlinda’s exclusive paraphernal property, became conjugal property when it was used as collateral for a housing loan that was paid through conjugal funds – Eliseo’s monthly salary deductions.

ISSUE:

Whether the subject property is paraphernal orconjugal

HELD:

The property is paraphernal property of Erlinda.

As a general rule, all property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved. In the present case, clear evidence that Erlinda inherited the residential lot from her father has sufficiently rebutted this presumption of conjugal ownership pursuant to Articles 92and 109 of the Family Code. The residential lot, therefore, is Erlinda’s exclusive paraphernal property.

Moreover, we cannot subscribe to the CA’s misplaced reliance on Article 158 of the Civil Code and Calimlim-Canullas. As the respondents were married during the effectivity of the Civil Code, its provisions on conjugal partnership of gains (Articles 142 to 189) should have governed their property relations. However, with the enactment of the Family Code on 3 August 1989, the Civil Code provisions on conjugal partnership of gains, including Article 158, have been superseded by those found in the Family Code (Articles 105 to 133).

Article 120 of the Family Code, which supersedes Article 158 of the Civil Code, provides the solution in determining the ownership of the improvements that are made on the separate property of the spouses, at the expense of the partnership or through the acts or efforts of either or both spouses. Applying the said provision to the present case, we find that Eliseo paid a portion only of the GSIS loan through monthly salary deductions. From 6 April 1989 to 30 April 1992, Eliseo paid about P60,755.76, not the entire amount of the GSIS housing loan plus interest, since the petitioner advanced the P176,445.27 paid by Erlinda to cancel the mortgage in 1992. Considering the P136,500.00 amount of the GSIS housing loan, it is fairly reasonable to assume that the value of the residential lot is considerably more than theP60,755.76 amount paid by Eliseo through monthly salary deductions. Thus, the subject property remained the exclusive paraphernal property of Erlinda at the time she contracted with the petitioner; the written consent of Eliseo to the transaction was not necessary. The NBI finding that Eliseo’s signatures in the special power of attorney and affidavit were forgeries was immaterial.

Nonetheless, the RTC and the CA apparently failed to consider the real nature of the contract between the parties (where the SC found that the contract is an equitable mortgage and not one of sale).

Article 75.

Minoru Fujiki, Petitioner, v. Maria Paz Galela Marinay, Shinichi Maekara, Local Civil Registrar Of Quezon City, And The Administrator And Civil Registrar General Of The National Statistics Office, Respondents.

G.R. No. 196049, 26 June 2013

Facts:

In January 2004, Minoru Fujiki, a Japanese citizen, married Maria Paz Marinay, a Filipino, here in the Philippines. But in May 2008, Marinay, while her marriage with Fujiki was still subsisting, married another Japanese citizen (Shinichi Maekara), here in the Philippines. Marinay and Maekara later went to Japan.

In 2010, Fujiki and Marinay reconciled and decided to resurrect their love affair. Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a Japanese judgment declaring Marinay’s marriage with Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. Said decree was granted in the same year. Fujiki and Marinay later went back home to the Philippines together.

In 2011, Fujiki went to the RTC of Quezon City and filed a petition entitled “Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)“. He filed the petition under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court (Cancellation Or Correction Of Entries In The Civil Registry). Basically, Fujiki wanted the following to be done:

(1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized;

(2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines; and

(3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).

The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that what Fujiki wanted is to have the marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared null (hence a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage); that under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the “Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages”, a petition for such may only be filed by the husband or wife or in this case either Maekara or Marinay only.

Issue:

Whether or not the RTC is correct.

Held:

No. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is not applicable here. What’s applicable is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. As aptly commented by the Solicitor General:

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure to record “[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons” in the civil registry as required by Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other words, “[t]he law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences upon a person’s legal capacity and status x x x.” The Japanese Family Court judgment directly bears on the civil status of a Filipino citizen and should therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.

Thus:

The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic, this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage “does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.”

But how will Fujiki’s petition in the RTC prosper?

Fujiki needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.

Fujiki may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through

(1) an official publication or

(2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office.

Article 59.

Benjamin Bugayong, plaintiff-appellant, v. Leonila Ginez, defendant-appellee.

G.R. No. L-10033, 28 December 1956

Facts:

On 27 August 1949, Benjamin Bugayong married Leonila Ginez at Asingan, Pangasinan. Before he left to continue his work as a US Navy service, he and Leonila stayed at Sampaloc, Manila with his sisters. By July 1951, Leonila left the dwelling of her sister-in-law and informed her husband she will be with her mother in Asingan, Pangasinan. Later, she went to Dagupan City to study in a local college.

Benjamin has been receiving letters since July 1951 that Leonila is having an affair with another man, a certain ‘Eliong’.

In August 1952, Benjamin returned to the Philippines, went to Pangasinan and sought for his wife whom he met in the house of Leonila’s godmother. They lived again as husband and wife and stayed in the house of Pedro Bugayong, cousin of the plaintiff-husband. On the second day, he tried to verify from his wife the truth of the information he received but instead of answering, Leonila packed up and left him which Benjamin concluded as a confirmation of the acts of infidelity. After he tried to locate her and upon failing he went to Ilocos Norte. Benjamin filed in the Court of the First Instance (CFI) of Pangasinan a complaint for legal separation against Leonila, who timely filed an answer vehemently denying the averments of the complaint.

Issue:

Whether or not the acts charged in line with the truth of allegations of the commission of acts of infidelity amounting to adultery have been condoned by the plaintiff-husband.

Held:

Granting that infidelities amounting to adultery were commited by the wife, the act of the husband in persuading her to come along with him and the fact that she went with him and together they slept as husband and wife deprives him as the alleged offended spouse of any action for legal separation against the offending wife because his said conduct comes within the restriction of Article 100 of Civil Code.

Condonation is the conditional forgiveness or remission, by a husband or wife of a matrimonial offense which the latter has committed.

Article 43.

Facts:

On 26 October 2000,Rita Quiao filed a complaint for legal separation against Brigido Quiao. The RTC ruled in favor of Rita with all their underaged children staying with Rita except Letecia who was of legal age.

Their acquired properties will be divided between the respondents and the petitioners subject to the respective legitimes of the children and the payment of the unpaid liabilities of PhP 45,740. The Petitioner's share of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children.

No Motion of Reconsideration or appeal was filed. By 12 December 2005, Petitioners filed for a motion of execution which the trial court granted, and a writ was issued. It was partially executed on 06 July 2006.

On 07 July 2006, or after more than 9 months from the promulgation of the decision, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Clarification, asking the RTC to define the term “Net Profits Earned.”

Thus, the RTC explained that the phrase “NET PROFIT EARNED” denotes “the remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of each [of the] spouse and the debts.” The Order further held that after determining the remainder of the properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of the common children because the offending spouse does not have any right to any share of the net profits earned, pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the Family Code. Thus, the RTC said that there was no blatant disparity when the sheriff intended to forfeit all the remaining properties after deducting the payments of the debts, because only separate properties of the Brigido shall be delivered to him which he has none.

Not satisfied with the Order, the Brigido filed an MR. Consequently, the RTC issued another Order dated 08 November 2006, holding that although the Decision dated 10 October 2005 has become final and executory, it may still consider the Motion for Clarification because Brigido simply wanted to clarify the meaning of “net profit earned.” Furthermore, the same Order held:

ALL TOLD, the Court Order dated 31 August 2006 is hereby ordered set aside. NET PROFIT EARNED, which is subject of forfeiture in favor of [the] parties' common children, is ordered to be computed in accordance [with] par. 4 of Article 102 of the Family Code.

Thereafter, Rita filed an MR praying for the correction and reversal of the Order dated 08 November 2006. Thereafter, on 08 January 2007, the trial court had changed its ruling again and granted the respondents' MR whereby the Order dated 08 November 2006 was set aside to reinstate the Order dated 31 August 2006. Not satisfied with the trial court's Order, Brigido filed on 27 February 2007 this instant Petition for Review under Rule 45.

Issue:

1) What law governs the dissolution and liquidation of the common properties of a couple who got married in 1977 (before the Family Code was enacted) and obtained a decree of legal separation when the Family Code is already in effect?

2) Can the Family Code be given retroactive effect for purposes of determining the net profits to forfeited as a result of the decree of legal separation without impairing vested rights acquired under the Old Civil Code?

Held:

1) Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code.

2) No, it cannot be given retroactive effect if it will impair vested rights. However, the Family Code applies in the instant case because there is no vested right that will be impaired. (based on Article 256 of the Family Code which provides for retroactivity except when vested rights will be impaired).

A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent do not depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder, or to the exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which is immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a contingency. It expresses the concept of present fixed interest which, in right reason and natural justice, should be protected against arbitrary State action, or innately just and imperative right which enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny.

Article 27.

Arsenio De Loria and Ricarda De Loria v. Felipe Apellan Felix

G.R. No. L-9005, 20 June 1958

Facts:

Before World War II, Matea dela Cruz and Felipe Apellan Felix were living for quite some time as husband and wife though without the sanctity of marriage. They acquired properties together but had no children.

Right after the liberation of Manila, Matea got ill. While being doing a confession to Father Gerardo Bautista,a Catholic priest, she admitted that she and Felipe were never married. Upon strong urging of the priest, they agreed. After the confession, Holy Communion, Sacrament of Extreme Unction, Father Bautista solemnized the union of the two, in articulo mortis, with Carmen Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra as sponsors or witness . The date was either 29 or 30 January 1945.

Matea recovered from her illness for a few months but eventually died on January 1946, with Fr. Bautista performing the burial ceremonies.

On 12 May 1952, Arsenio de Loria and Ricarda de Loria, grand nephew and niece, respectively, of Matea by her sister Adriana dela Cruz, filed a complaint against Felipe to compel him to account and turnover the properties left by their grand aunt Matea. Felipe responded that he was the widower of the late Matea, therefore, the rightful claimant. The Court of First Instance gave a favorable judgment for the petitioners, but on appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed and dismissed the complaint.

The petitioners appealed the decision of the CA citing that the marriage of Felipe and Matea, though solemnized by a Catholic priest, was not registered to the local civil registrar.

Issue:

Is a marriage between two parties legal though no marriage license were issued?

Ruling:

Yes, according to the Supreme Court. In the old Marriage Law, failure to sign the marriage contract is not a cause of annulment.

Bearing in mind that the "essential requisites for marriage are the legal capacity of the contracting parties and their consent" (section 1 of the old Marriage Law), the latter being manifested by the declaration of "the parties" "in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage and of two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife" — which in this case actually occurred. The Supreme Court opined that the signing of the marriage contract or certificate was required by the statute simply for the purpose of evidencing the act. No statutory provision or court ruling has been cited making it an essential requisite — not the formal requirement of evidentiary value. The fact of marriage is one thing; the proof by which it may be established is quite another.

Father Bautista was at fault for not registering the formal union of the couple to the local civil registrar. This does not mean that the non-registration of the marriage is a ground for annulment. Therefore, the married couple should not suffer for the omission of Father Bautista.

Felipe is the rightful claimant to the estate of Matea -being the husband. As such, the claims of the petitioner was denied.

Article 11.